Questions 1–5.

Questions 6–10. Select the TWO correct answer choices.

Questions 11–15 are based on the passage below.

The trolley problem, a thought experiment first posed in the philosophical literature in the 1960s and refined by subsequent authors, asks whether it is morally permissible to divert a runaway trolley onto a track where it will kill one person, thereby saving five people on the track it would otherwise strike. Most respondents say yes. A variant of the same underlying dilemma asks whether it would be permissible to push a large stranger off a bridge to stop the trolley with his body, sacrificing one to save the same five. Most respondents say no, despite the fact that the numerical outcome — one death instead of five — is identical in both cases. Philosophers have proposed various explanations for this asymmetry: some argue that using someone as a mere means to an end (pushing the stranger) differs morally from redirecting a threat that would have killed him anyway (diverting the trolley), even when the numbers are the same. Others contend the difference lies in physical directness: pushing requires personal, hands-on violence in a way that flipping a switch does not, and human moral intuition may simply be more sensitive to direct physical harm than to equally lethal but more abstract mechanisms. Neuroscientific studies using brain imaging have found that the "push" version activates emotional processing regions more strongly than the "switch" version, suggesting the asymmetry may reflect a genuine difference in how the brain processes the two scenarios, rather than a simple inconsistency in moral reasoning.

Questions 16–20 are based on the passage below.

Moral relativism, the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to a particular culture or individual rather than universally, is often introduced to students as a tolerant, open-minded alternative to rigid moral absolutism. Closer philosophical examination, however, reveals the position to be considerably harder to sustain consistently than its intuitive appeal suggests. If moral truth is genuinely relative to culture, then a culture that condemns another culture's practices as wrong would itself simply be expressing its own relative standard, with no more objective standing than the practice it condemns; the relativist framework, taken to its logical conclusion, appears to leave no principled basis for criticizing even the most widely condemned historical atrocities, since the perpetrating culture's own standards, by the relativist's own premise, cannot be judged wrong from outside. Some relativists respond by distinguishing between tolerance of differing customs, such as dress or diet, and a residual core of cross-cultural moral agreement, such as prohibitions on gratuitous cruelty, that they argue exists across virtually all human societies despite surface variation. Critics reply that this move effectively abandons strict relativism by smuggling back in a form of universal moral standard, undermining the position's original claim that no such universal standard exists.